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Abstract – Both Flash crowds and DDoS (Distributed 
Denial-of-Service) attacks have very similar properties in 
terms of internet traffic, however Flash crowds are 
legitimate flows and DDoS attacks are illegitimate flows, 
and DDoS attacks have been a serious threat to internet 
security and stability. In this paper we propose a set of 
novel methods using probability metrics to distinguish 
DDoS attacks from Flash crowds effectively, and our 
simulations show that the proposed methods work well. In 
particular, these mathods can not only distinguish DDoS 
attacks from Flash crowds clearly, but also can distinguish 
the anomaly flow being DDoS attacks flow or being Flash 
crowd flow from Normal network flow effectively. 
Furthermore, we show our proposed hybrid probability 
metrics can greatly reduce both false positive and false 
negative rates in detection.   
Keywords: DDoS, Flash crowd, Probability metrics 
1. Introduction
Nowadays, DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) 
attacks still are one of the most destructive attacking means 
and the sources of mass disruption on internet. DDoS 
attacks typically occur when a large number of internet 
packets from compromised hosts (zombies) flood the 
bandwidth or resources of a single target (victim), and the 
flood of incoming messages to the victim essentially forces 
it to respond so slowly as to be rendered effectively 
unavailable and even to shut down, thereby coursing denial 
of service for legitimate users of the targeted system [5]. 
Flash crowds are large surges of legitimate traffic focus 
on some specify sites on internet over the relatively short 
period of time. In general, Flash crowds usually occur on 
popular web sites when hundreds and thousands of requests 
access to the web servers simultaneously. Flash crowds are 
quite similar with DDoS attacks in terms of network 
anomaly and traffic phenomenon; in fact sometimes also 
can cause a web site or target to slow down its service for 
users or even temporarily close due to the significantly 
increased traffic [1, 11, 16, 18]. 
Although Flash crowds and DDoS attacks are very much 
alike in their traffic behaviors, there are still some main 
differences between them in their nature and origin such as 
their access intents and the distributions of their source IP 
address and the increased and decreased speeds of traffic 
between them. In this paper, we take full advantage of these 
differences to distinguish DDoS attacks from Flash crowds 
using our proposed approaches effectively and quickly [2, 
8]. 
In statistical theory, the probability metric [15, 19] is a 
numerical function on the space or distance of distributions 
of random elements. It must satisfy the following 
conditions and properties: 
Let the probability metric be , yxD , zyx ,, R .
We have: 
1. Identity property:  yxD , =0, while yx  .
2. Symmetry property:  yxD , = . xyD ,
3. Triangle inequality:  yxD , d  zxD , +  yzD , .
The probability metric includes many classes such as the 
total variation metric and the Bhattacharyya metric which 
both are the most important probability metrics. The total 
variation metric mainly measures the difference of two 
discrete probability distributions, and the Bhattacharyya 
metric is then mainly used to measure the similarity of two 
discrete probability distributions. We can take full 
advantage of the properties of the total variation metric and 
the Bhattacharyya metric to distinguish DDoS attacks from 
Flash crowds.  
The main contributions of this paper are: 
1. It proposes using a hybrid metric of the total 
variation metric and the Bhattacharyya metric to 
distinguish clearly DDoS attacks from Flash 
crowds. The proposed hybrid metric also can 
reduce the false positive rate greatly. 
2. It proposes the idea and concept of using the hybrid 
probability metric to distinguish not only DDoS 
attacks from Flash crowds but also DDoS attacks 
from Normal network flow and even Flash crowds 
from Normal network flow, and shows that the 
proposed metric works well.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We 
analyses the traffic models in section 2; in section 3 we 
provide the detection algorithm and system analysis. In 
section 4 we analyses the effectiveness of our proposed 
metric using real datasets. Section 5 analyses the system’s 
detection sensitivity and section 6 presents our simulation 
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results. Finally we conclude our paper and present the 
future work in section 7.
2. Traffic Model Analysis 
We know that Flash crowds and DDoS attacks are very 
similar in traffic behavior from macroscopic observation; 
however there are also several essential differences in the 
aspects of access intents, distributions of source IP address 
and speed of the increased and decreased traffic. 
At first, their access intents are quite different. Flash 
crowds are the results of the legitimate users respond to 
special events such as breaking news or popular products 
(movies, music and software) release. All the users just 
want to obtain the information or material they wanted 
from the server; they expect their access are successful and 
quick, do if the server is slowed down or even shut down 
are the things that they are extremely unwilling to see. 
However, DDoS attacks are not social events and all the 
requests are launched by attackers and are illegitimate. The 
attackers have only one aim that is to shut down the server 
quickly, or to cause the server not available for legitimate 
users.
Secondly, the distributions of the source IP address are 
also quite different between Flash crowds and DDoS 
attacks. The users of Flash crowds are just interested in the 
specified events in the server, they can come from the 
whole community network or the whole internet, so the 
distribution of source IP addresses in Flash crowds is very 
dispersive; If we aggregate these IP addresses, the 
distribution of source IP addresses will be subject to the 
fractional Gaussian noise distribution [10, 14] 
approximately but is more dispersive than it, so the 
waveform of the distribution of source IP addresses after 
aggregation in Flash crowds is more flat than the waveform 
of the fractional Gaussian noise distribution. However, in 
DDoS attacks, all the users are illegitimate as all the 
requests are launched by attackers or zombies. Therefore, 
the distribution of source IP addresses is concentrated 
relatively according to the limited attackers or zombies. If 
we aggregate these source addresses, the number of the 
source IP addresses in DDoS attacks will be decreased 
quickly and the distribution of source IP addresses will be 
subject to the Poisson distribution [7, 17].  
Thirdly, there is a big difference in the increased and 
decreased speed of traffics between them. In Flash crowds, 
all users are impossible to access simultaneously the same 
server at the beginning, because the messages or news need 
take time to spread among the users; So the number of 
requests to the server is increased gradually then to the 
peak; similarly, at the end stage of the Flash crowds, all 
users will not lose their interesting to the server 
simultaneously, so the number of requests to the server will 
be decreased gradually from the peak. However, in DDoS 
attacking, the attackers or zombies must launch a large 
number of requests to the server simultaneously or within a 
very short time difference to achieve the desired attack 
effect, it is not difficult that because the DDoS attacks are 
controlled by machines completely, so to launch attacks at 
the same time can be completed automatically by machines; 
Therefore, the number of requests to the server is increased 
sharply to reach the peak, and then will be decreased 
sharply also at the end stage of the DDoS attacks.
3. Detection Algorithm and System Analysis 
The total variation [3, 13] is one of the most important 
divergences in mathematical statistics; it can measure the 
largest possible difference between two probability 
distributions which can assign to the same event. Given two 
complete probability distributions P= (p1, p2, … , pn ) and
Q= (q1, q2, … , qn) with , 1 pi 0,
1 qi 0, i={1, 2, …, n}. We have the total variation 
between them as follows: 
1
11
  ¦¦
  
n
i
i
n
i
i qp t t
t t
  ¦
 
 
n
i
ii qpQPT
1
||,
 QPT , =0, while P=Q.
Obviously,  QPT , =  PQT , , so the total variation is 
symmetric measure and belongs to the probability metric. 
The value of the total variation is increasing from zero 
denotes that the difference between two distributions is 
expending.  
The Bhattacharyya coefficient [4, 6, 9] is another most 
popular statistical measure and sometimes it is also called 
the similarity coefficient and it measures the similarity of 
two discrete probability distributions. Obviously, on the 
other hand it is also a divergence-type measure and can be 
used to measure the dissimilarity of any two classes in 
classification. Given two complete probability distributions 
P and Q, the conditions are same as the above. The 
Bhattacharyya coefficient between P and Q is denoted 
by  QP,U , the definition as follows: 
 QP,U =¦
 
n
i
iiqp
1
The properties of the Bhattacharyya coefficient: 
1. 0d  QP,U d 1
2.  QP,U =1, while P=Q.
3.  QP,U =0, while P is orthogonal to Q.
The Bhattacharyya coefficient has the symmetric 
property and is also a probability metric as  QP,U =  PQ,U . The value of the Bhattacharyya 
coefficient indicates the similarity between two probability 
distributions, unit indicates the strongest similarity, and on 
the contrary, zero indicates the weakest similarity between 
the distributions. So the Bhattacharyya coefficient is also 
named the similarity coefficient. 
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     Based on above discussion and analysis, we design the 
DDoS detection system shown as Figure 1 which uses the 
hybrid probability metric of total variation and similarity 
coefficient to distinguish DDoS attacks flow from Flash 
crowd flow and DDoS attacks flow from Normal network 
flow, and even also can distinguish the anomaly being 
DDoS attacks flow or Flash crowd flow from Normal 
network flow very well.  
     The detection system includes five parts such as flow 
anomaly detector, flow distribution estimator, hybrid 
probability metric calculator and decision device. The main 
function of each part is described as follows. The flow 
anomaly detector is a multi-input and bi-output device 
which detects the flows anomaly of the incoming flows in a 
specified router, and only having the anomaly flow; it can 
take effect and output two flows which include one 
abnormal flow at least. The flow distribution estimator is 
used to sample the flow’s distribution according to its 
recognizable characteristics in the sampling period to 
obtain the flow probability distribution. The hybrid 
probability metric calculator is used to compute the values 
of the total variation and the similarity coefficient of two 
flows in parallel. The decision device is used to distinguish 
DDoS attacks flow from Flash crowd flow or Normal 
network flow, and deside the anomaly flow being DDoS 
attacks flow or flash crowd flow from Normal network 
flow by the combined using the grouping thresholds GTT
and GTS, in this paper, the grouping threshold GTT and GTS
express the values of decision in detecting DDoS attacks 
using the total variation metric and the similarity coefficient 
metric respectively, if it decides the anomaly flow being 
DDoS attacks flow, it can discard the attacks flow 
immediately, otherwise pass the flow to the destination or 
the downstream routers. 
Figure 1. DDoS attacks detection system of using the 
hybrid probability metric
     Listing 1 is the detection algorithm of using the hybrid 
probability metric which can not only detect DDoS attacks 
flow form Flash crowd flow and Normal network flow 
clearly, but also can decide the anomaly flow being DDoS 
attacks flow or Flash crowd flow from Normal network 
flow very well. It can reduce both false positive rate and 
false negative rate as well. 
Listing 1. The detection algorithm of using the 
hybrid probability metric 
The DDoS attacks detection algorithm: 
1. Set the sampling frequency as f, the sampling 
period as T, and the grouping thresholds as GTT
and GTS.
2. In the router after aggregation of traffic, 
sampling the network flows come from the 
upstream routers. 
3. Calculate the numbers of packet which has 
various recognizable characteristics (such as the 
source IP address or the packet’s size, etc.) in 
each sampling time interval W (W =
f
1
) within 
T.
4. Calculate in parallel the probability distributions 
of the sampled network flows. 
5. Calculate in parallel the values of the total 
variation and the similarity coefficient among 
each of the pair using the formulas as follows: 
  ¦
 
 
n
i
ii qpQPT
1
||,
and  QP,U =¦
 
n
i
iiqp
1
6. If the value of the total variation of any two 
distributions is more than the lower bound of 
the grouping threshold GTT (1.1045) and the 
value of the similarity coefficient is less than the 
upper bound of GTS (0.7220), then the system 
detected the DDoS attacks from Flash crowds, 
and begins to raise alarms and discard attack 
packets.
7. If the value of total variation is located in the 
grouping threshold GTT (the lower bound: 
0.5921, and the upper bound: 1.1045) and the 
value of the similarity coefficient is located in 
GTS (the lower bound: 0.7220, and the upper 
bound: 0.8708), then the system detected the 
DDoS attacks from Normal network flow, and 
begins to raise alarms and discard attack 
packets.
8. If the value of the total variation of any two 
distributions is less than the upper bound of the 
grouping threshold GTT (0.5921) and the value 
of the similarity coefficient is more than the 
lower bound of GTS (0.8708), then the system 
detected the Flash crowds from Normal network 
flow, and begins to raise alarms.  
9. Otherwise the router forwards the packets to the 
destination or the downstream routers. 
10. Return to step 2. 
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4. Effectiveness Analysis
To analyze the effectiveness of our proposed metric in 
detecting DDoS attacks, we use the real datasets in our 
experiment as follows.  Firstly, we use the MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory Scenario (DDoS) 2.0.2 dataset [20] as the 
incoming DDoS attacks flow, in which the scenario 
includes a distributed denial service attack run by a novice 
attacker and is performed over multiple networks. We 
downloaded and used the inside tcpdump sensor dataset 
where the sniffer is on the "inside" network to do the 
experiment. In the inside tcpdump data-set, we used the 
dataset with TCP protocol only filter and obtained a TCP 
SYN flooding data set, the partial attack scenario is shown 
as Figure 2; this is because that we know the DDoS attack 
in this scenario only contains a TCP SYN flooding attack, 
so the filtered data-set can simplify our execution. 
Figure 2. TCP SYN flooding scenario from MIT/LL, X-
axis denotes tick interval (minute), Y-axis denotes 
packets/tick
From Figure 2 we know that the DDoS attacks were 
launched from the 80th minute and end to the 82nd minute 
by an attacker in the attacks scenario, obviously, it is a 
small and simple DDoS attack.  
Secondly, we filter the DDoS attacks flow dada from the 
same MIT Lincoln Laboratory Scenario (DDoS) 2.0.2 
dataset and can obtain the Normal network flow dataset to 
simulate approximately the Normal network flow in our 
experiment. 
And thirdly, we use a day of HTTP logs dataset from a 
very busy WWW server as the incoming Flash crowds flow 
approximately. This dataset contains a day's worth of all 
HTTP requests to the SDSC WWW server located at the 
San Diego Supercomputer Center in San Diego, California 
[21].  
Finally, we process, replace and classify the DDoS 
attacks dataset, the Normal network flow dataset and the 
Flash crowd flow dataset by their source addresses 
according to requirements, and sample out the comparable 
sample points which hold the uniform length and interval 
from the classified datasets by the certain period. Their 
probability distribution of source IP addresses is shown as 
Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Probability density distribution of source IP 
addresses of DDoS attacks flow, Normal network flow 
and Flash crowds flow 
    We test our proposed metric using the above datasets; the 
experimental results are shown as Table 1. 
Table 1. Values of total variation and similarity 
coefficient among DDoS attacks flow, Normal network 
flow and Flash crowds flow 
          Flows 
Metrics
Flash
Crowds 
vs.
DDoS
Attacks
Normal 
Flows
vs.
DDoS
Attacks
Flash
crowds
vs.
Normal 
Flows
Total 
Variation 
0.8469 0.7053 0.4596
Grouping 
Threshold 
GTT
Lower
Bound:  
0.7761
Upper
Bound: 
0.7761
and
Lower
Bound: 
0.5825
Upper
Bound: 
0.5825
Similarity 
Coefficient
0.8476 0.9047 0.9526
Grouping 
Threshold 
GTS
Upper
Bound: 
0.8762
Upper
Bound: 
0.9287
and
Lower
Bound 
0.8762
Lower
Bound: 
0.9287
From Table 1 we know that our proposed metric can not 
only detect DDoS attacks flow from Normal network flow 
effectively but also can distinguish DDoS attacks flow from 
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Flash crowd flow clearly, and even can detect Flash crowd 
flow from Normal network flow very well, it means that it 
can decide the anomaly flow being DDoS attacks flow or 
Flash crowd flow from Normal network flow. 
5. Detection Sensitivity Analysis 
 In this section we focus on discussing the false positive 
rate of the detection system. The false negative rate has the 
same principle. We can predigest the detection system 
shown as Figure 4 for the aim of analysis. 
Figure 4. The simplified DDoS attacks detection system 
of using the hybrid probability metric 
In the simplified detection system, the flow distribution 
collector & estimator collects and estimates the input flows 
and exports the flow distributions towards decision devices 
in which the total variation metric decision device T 
calculates the input flow distributions using the total 
variation metric and distinguishes out the attack flow AT
from the legitimate flow LT, in parallel, the similarity 
coefficient metric decision device S calculates the input 
flow distributions using the similarity coefficient metric and 
distinguishes out the attack flow AS from the legitimate 
flow LS.
We take advantage of the set concept which is shown as 
Figure 5 to discuss the false positive and negative rate of 
the detection system. We set the output legitimate flows LT
and LS as LT set and LS set respectively, the output attack 
flow AT and AS as AT set and AS set respectively, U set is 
the universal set of the output flows, A set and L set are the 
universal sets of the attack flows and the legitimate flows 
respectively. Therefore, we have 
U = LT+ AT = LS+ AS
A = AT AS = AT AS + (AT - AT AS) + (AS - 
AT AS)
  
L = U – A = LT LS = U - ATAS - (AT - ATAS) - 
(AS - ATAS)
Figure 5. Output sets of the detection system using the 
hybrid probability metric 
Let TK and SK be the false positive rates of using the 
total variation metric and the similarity coefficient metric in 
DDoS attacks detecting respectively, so if the attack flows 
are detected by both the total variation metric and the 
similarity coefficient metric synchronously, then the false 
positive rate of using the hybrid probability metric will be 
K = TK * SK , namely, the detected attack flows all are 
located in the set AT AS. If the attack flow is detected 
only by the total variation metric decision device or the 
similarity coefficient metric decision device, then it will be 
decided further by checking the information of IP 
package’s header, if it is empty, then the flow will be 
decided as the attack flow. Let HK  be the false positive rate 
of using IP package’s header checking metric, therefore, 
the false positive rates after checking the information of IP 
package’s header will be TK * HK  or SK *
HK respectively, namely, the detected attack flow is located 
in the set AT - AT  AS or the set AS - AT  AS . 
Obviously, if we also check the information of IP 
package’s header after the attack flows are detected by both 
the total variation metric and the similarity coefficient 
metric at the same time, the false positive rate of the 
detection system will be decreased to TK * SK * HK .
Therefore, our proposed hybrid metric can reduce the 
false positive rate greatly in DDoS detecting, the same, the 
false negative rate can be reduced clearly too. 
The process of flow processing and deciding in detection 
system is shown as Figure 6. The incoming flows are 
collected and estimated to various probability distributions 
by the flow distribution collector & estimator; the devices 
of total variation metric decision and similarity coefficient 
metric decision calculate the values of the total variation 
and the similarity coefficient between the various 
probability distributions respectively. The collaborative 
grouping thresholds decision device is a core part in our 
proposed detection system, it will distinguishes the attack 
flows from the legitimate flows correctly according to the 
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algorithm and approach we discussed above, for example, 
if the calculated values of total variation and similarity 
coefficient both are within their own grouping thresholds 
(the detailed data is shown as Table 1&2, for the aim of 
discussion, we assume that the boundary values of sets AT
and AS in Figure 5 are the grouping thresholds values of 
using the total variation metric and the similarity coefficient 
metric respectively), namely, the value of total variation is 
located in the set AT, and the value of similarity coefficient 
is located in the set AS in Figure 5, the decision device will 
decide that the detected flow is a attack flow by the 
K = TK * SK  false positive rate and then discard it; 
otherwise, if the values of total variation and similarity 
coefficient both are located in the set L = U – A, the 
decision device will decide that the detected flow is a 
legitimate flow and pass it to the destination or the 
downstream routers; however, if the values are not both 
within their own grouping thresholds, namely, the values 
both can be located in the set (AT - ATAS) or set (AS - 
AT AS) in Figure 5, the collaborative grouping thresholds 
decision device will hand in the flows to the IP header 
checking device to check whether the flows’ IP headers are 
empty or not, if they are empty, the final decision device 
will decide that the detected flow is a attack flow by the 

TK * HK  or SK * HK  false positive rate and then discard it; 
otherwise, the device will decide that the detected flow is a 
legitimate flow and pass it to the destination or the 
downstream routers. 
Figure 6. Flows processing and deciding in the detection 
system of using the hybrid probability metric 
6. Simulation and Experiment Results 
6.1 Simulation Results 
Although the MIT Lincoln Laboratory data-sets have 
been used to evaluate lots of attack detection systems and 
algorithms by a number researchers, there still is a lack of 
standard and appropriate evaluation data-set that can be 
used to simulate the realistic network environments 
currently. As indicated by McHugh [12] etc. that the 
methodology used to generate the data by MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory and the data itself are not appropriate for 
simulating the realistic network environments. 
Furthermore, the Flash crowd dataset we used in the 
experiments is not perfect, as the data providers have 
removed all of the client IP addresses and replaced them 
with unique but unclear identifier to ensure the privacy of 
each individual that visited the SDSC WWW server.  
Therefore, in our simulations, we consider using the 
Poisson distribution to simulate the DDoS attacks flow [7], 
using the fractional Gaussian noise distribution to simulate 
the Normal network flow [10, 14] and using the adjusted 
fractional Gaussian noise distribution (the number of source 
IP addresses increased 7 times and the value of probability 
of distributions decreased 5 times than in the Normal 
network flows) to simulate the Flash crowd flows 
approximately [1]. The simulation results are described in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Values of total variation and similarity 
coefficient among DDoS attacks flow, Normal network 
flow and Flash crowd flow 
          Flows 
Metrics
Flash
Crowds 
vs.
DDoS
Attacks
Normal 
Flows
vs.
DDoS
Attacks
Flash
crowds
vs.
Normal 
Flows
Total 
Variation 
1.1556 1.0533 0.1309
Grouping 
Threshold 
GTT
Lower
Bound:  
1.1045
Upper
Bound: 
1.1045
and
Lower
Bound: 
0.5921
Upper
Bound: 
0.5921
Similarity 
Coefficient
0.6995 0.7445 0.9970
Grouping 
Threshold 
GTS
Upper
Bound: 
0.7220
Upper
Bound: 
0.8708
and
Lower
Bound 
0.7220
Lower
Bound: 
0.8708
14
Authorized licensed use limited to: DEAKIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. Downloaded on May 05,2010 at 06:02:19 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
From Table 2, we can see that the value of total variation 
achieves the maximum (1.1556) between Flash crowds and 
DDoS attacks in this three pairs which are Flash crowds vs. 
DDoS attacks, Normal flows vs. DDoS attacks and Flash 
crowds vs. Normal flows. And the value of total variation 
achieves the minimum (0.1309) between Flash crowds and 
Normal flows. Therefore, it fully shows that the 
distributions of source IP addresses of Flash crowds and 
Normal flows are very similar, but the distributions of Flash 
crowds and DDoS attacks are quite different. So, we can 
use these properties to distinguish DDoS attacks from Flash 
crowds clearly and quickly. On the other hand, we can see 
that the value of similarity coefficient achieves the 
maximum (0.9970) between Flash crowds and Normal 
flows in the three pairs, and the value of similarity 
coefficient achieves the minimum (0.6995) between Flash 
crowds and DDoS attacks, so it also shows that the 
distributions of source IP addresses of Flash crowds and 
Normal flows are very similar, and the distributions of 
Flash crowds and DDoS attacks are quite different. The 
same, we can use this property to distinguish DDoS attacks 
from Flash crowds clearly. 
In this paper, we use the hybrid probability metric to 
detect DDoS attacks for the aim of reducing the false 
positive rate and the false negative rate. We compute the 
values of total variation and similarity coefficient of any 
two distributions of the network flows at first, if the value 
of total variation is more than the lower bound GTT
(1.1045) and the value of similarity coefficient is less than 
the upper bound GTS (0.7220), we can decide that the two 
distributions are the flows of Flash crowds and DDoS 
attacks, and then to discard the DDoS attacks flows, if the 
value of total variation is more than the lower bound GTT
(0.5921) and less than the upper bound GTT (1.1045), and 
the value of similarity coefficient is more than the lower 
bound GTS (0.7220) and less than the upper bound GTS
(0.8708), we can decide the two distributions are the DDoS 
attacks flow and the Normal network flow, the same, we 
can decide the two distributions are the Flash crowds flow 
and the Normal network flow if the value of total variation 
is less than the upper bound GTT (0.5921) but is not closed 
to zero it means that they are not the same distributions and 
the value of similarity coefficient is more than the lower 
bound GTS (0.8708) but is not closed to unit it means that 
they are not the same distributions. 
6.2 Experiment Results 
   We also test the proposed metric in the simulative   
network environment using the standard network software. 
At first, we simulate the DDoS attacks flow, Flash crowds 
flow and the Normal network flow are shown in Figure 7. 
In our network simulation, we set up a campus network 
firstly which has three different network sizes to simulate 
approximately DDoS attacks flow, Flash crowds flow and 
Normal network flow respectively through the different 
network loads of the server. 
   In Figure 7, the blue curve represents the Normal flow, 
while the campus network is a small network size which 
has a few of  nodes; the red curve represents the DDoS 
flow, while the campus network is a large network size 
which has a large number of nodes, all nodes are regarded 
as the attack nodes and connected by only several routers, 
and we allocate the different source IP addresses to the 
entire nodes according to the different routers and the 
number of the different IP addresses is the same number as 
the routers; the green curve represents the Flash Crowds 
flow, while the campus network also is a large network size 
which has a large number of nodes and the all nodes are 
regarded as the Flash crowds nodes in which we allocate 
the different source IP addresses for each of all nodes.
Figure 7. Simulative DDoS attacks flow, Flash crowds 
flow and Normal network flow in campus network 
environment
Secondly, we test the proposed metric among the 
incoming flows of DDoS attacks flow, Flash crowds flow 
and Normal network flow. Figure 8&9 show the decision 
results between these flows by using the proposed total 
variation metric and similarity coefficient metric 
respectively.
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Figure 8. Decision results among the DDoS attacks flow, 
Flash crowds flow and the Normal network flow using 
the proposed total variation metric 
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Figure 9. Decision results among the DDoS attacks flow, 
Flash crowds flow and the Normal network flow using 
the proposed similarity coefficient metric 
Therefore, from above experimental results we can know 
that the proposed metric can not only distinguish out 
different network flows clearly (there are big gaps among 
these flows) but also early (can distinguish out flows at the 
first sampling period). During the DDoS attacks detecting, 
while network is in the normal network traffic environment, 
if the detection system detected the incoming flows are 
DDoS attacks flow and Normal network flow, the system 
will discard the attacks flow immediately; if the system 
detected the incoming flows are Flash crowds flow and 
Normal network flow, the system will forward the Flash 
crowds flow to the destination or the downstream routers; 
and while network is in Flash crowds traffic environment, 
if the system detected the incoming flows are DDoS attacks 
flow and Flash crowds flow, the system will discard the 
attacks flow immediately and forward the Flash crowds 
flow to the destination or the downstream routers.  
7. Conclusion and Future Work
   In this paper, we propose using hybrid probability metrics 
to detect DDoS attacks, and through experiment and 
simulation we show that the proposed metric can not only 
detect DDoS attacks from the normal flows, but also can 
distinguish DDoS attacks from Flash crowds clearly, and 
even can distinguish the anomaly flow being DDoS attacks 
flow or Flash crowds flow from the Normal network flow 
very well; Furthermore, our proposed hybrid metric can 
reduce both the false positive rate and the false negative 
rate greatly, so it can improve the detection sensitivity 
clearly. Our further research will be to verify the proposed 
hybrid metric in the real network situation, and to find more 
recognizable characteristics of IP packets and flows to 
achieve better detection effects in DDoS attacks detecting.   
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